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DAVID KOHLER*
Forty Years After New York Times v.
Sullivan : The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly
Any similarity between the title of my remarks and a famousClint Eastwood movie is purely coincidental.  I chose the
title because it nicely summarized what I wanted to talk about at
this Conference examining New York Times Co. v. Sullivan  forty
years later.1  But as I began thinking about old Clint, one of his
more famous lines came to mind.  Remember in Dirty Harry ,
when his character confronts a bad guy in an armed standoff, and
with that classic Eastwood squinty snarl asks: “You’ve got to ask
yourself a question: Do I feel lucky?”2  It seems to me in many
ways that this line, perhaps better than any other, sums up a good
bit of what libel litigation is like today in the wake of the Sullivan
case.
The particular question posed by this panel is: does Sullivan
represent a constitutional revolution?  The easy answer is clearly
yes.  The decision overturned the view previously expressed by
the Supreme Court that libel was a form of unprotected speech,3
and it upended hundreds of years of settled common and state
* Professor of Law and Director, The Donald E. Biederman National Entertain-
ment and Media Law Institute, Southwestern University School of Law.  Formerly,
the author was senior vice president and general counsel of Cable News Network
(CNN).  This article is a somewhat expanded version of remarks delivered at New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan  Forty Years After, a conference cosponsored by the Uni-
versity of Oregon’s Schools of Law and Journalism.  The author would like to thank
Lee Levine, Paul Horwitz, and Kevin Baine for their helpful suggestions and Leah
Bolea for her assistance with the article.
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 The Movie Quotes Site, at  http://moviequotes.com/fullquote.cgi?qnum=6093
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
3 See  Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 292 (1952) (“[P]unishment of libelous
words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace’ has never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.”
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))).
[1203]
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defamation law.4  The more interesting question is whether the
case has fulfilled its central promise to create a legal regime that
fosters “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate.5  That an-
swer may depend on one’s perspective: what might the libel
world look like without the protections afforded by Sullivan  as
opposed to what the world looks like with it?  It is those ques-




Given how radically Sullivan and its progeny have changed
defamation law over the last forty years, it is hard to imagine
what the world might look like without it.  My instinct, however,
is that absent its considerable constitutional restraints, the pic-
ture would not be pretty—at least from the media perspective,
which is where I admittedly come from.
A. The International Libel Capital
To get an idea of what the world might be like without Sulli-
van , we can look at the state of affairs in England, which largely
still applies the common law of libel and offers little if any special
protection to the press or any other speaker who utters defama-
tory remarks.  In England, a libel plaintiff still need prove only
that the defendant published a statement capable of defamatory
meaning and the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove
truth or privilege.6  Although England does recognize some priv-
ilege for certain kinds of statements about government or those
holding public office, it has expressly rejected the kinds of pro-
tection offered by Sullivan .7  As described by Rod Smolla:
This striking disparity between American and British libel law
has led to a curious recent phenomenon, a sort of balance of
trade deficit in libel litigation: Prominent persons who receive
bad press in publications distributed primarily in the United
4 There is a large volume of scholarly literature on the changes to defamation law
wrought by Sullivan  and its progeny.  Much of the most notable scholarship has
been catalogued by Professor David Anderson. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel
Law Worth Reforming?,  140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 n.3 (1991).
5 Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 270.
6 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.03[2] (1991).
7 See  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] W.L.R. 1010 (House of Lords
1999).
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States now often choose to file their libel suits in England.
London has become an international libel capital.  Plaintiffs
with the wherewithal to do so now often choose to file suit in
Britain in order to exploit Britain’s strict libel laws, even when
the plaintiffs and the publication have little connection to that
country.8
In a similar vein, Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nichol, in
their text on media law, observed that “British libel law is so no-
toriously favourable to plaintiffs that an increasing number of fo-
rum-shopping foreigners are taking action in London against
newspapers and books that are printed, and mainly circulated,
abroad.”9
If the British experience is any indication, it seems reasonable
to surmise that in the absence of Sullivan , people—and in partic-
ular prominent or powerful people—aggrieved by a defamatory
publication (or broadcast) would more willingly and frequently
bring suit in the United States.  Indeed, because of certain con-
straints on litigation in the United Kingdom that do not apply in
the United States, I suspect plaintiff activity here would be, to
steal Justice Brennan’s phrase, far more robust and uninhibited
than it is in England.10
In England there are at least two constraints on litigation that
have little or no applicability in the United States.  First, in En-
gland the loser ordinarily pays the costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the winning party.11  The
rule in the United States is precisely the opposite; each party
bears its own fees in most libel litigation,12 and plaintiffs here
typically are represented by counsel on a contingent fee basis.13
Thus, an unsuccessful plaintiff in the United States ordinarily will
8 SMOLLA, supra  note 6, § 1.03[3].  Plaintiffs’ gravitation to more favorable libel R
venues outside the United States extends beyond England. See  Mark Thompson,
Lawyers Alarmed by International Libel Lawsuit Trend , USC Annenberg Online
Journalism Review, (Nov. 2, 2004), at  http://www.ojr.org/ojr/law/1099435840.php
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
9 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON Q.C. & ANDREW NICHOL, MEDIA LAW 65 (3d ed., Pen-
guin Books 1992).
10 Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 270.
11 See PATRICK MILMO & W.V.H. ROGERS, EDS., GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLAN-
DER § 35:12 (10th ed. 2004).
12 The only real exception is where a party has litigated frivolously, but this hap-
pens only rarely. See  Seth Goodchild, Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance
to Modern Libel Law , 75 GEO. L.J. 315, 344-45 (1986).
13 See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:  MYTH AND
REALITY 148 (1987) (finding that more than eighty percent of plaintiffs in a study of
libel litigation were represented on a contingent fee basis).
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not be exposed to significant financial liability from a defeat.14
In England, however, plaintiffs do have a financial downside
which should at least have some governing effect.
Second, in England, courts impose fairly strict limits on the
size of damage awards in libel cases.15  As I will discuss more
fully later,16 in the United States there is a tradition of much
larger damage awards, including significant punitive damages
which would make litigation here even more attractive in the ab-
sence of Sullivan .  One need only look at the Sullivan  case itself
to see how difficult things might have been here. Sullivan  arose
out of a $500,000 verdict,17 which in 1964 was a lot of money.
Moreover, as recounted in Justice Black’s concurring opinion,
another $500,000 verdict had been entered against the Times
arising out of the same advertisement, and eleven suits were
pending by local and state Alabama officials against the Times
seeking $5.6 million and five suits against CBS seeking $1.7 mil-
lion.18  Although Sullivan arose out of unusual and particularly
charged circumstances,19 so too do many other libel cases involve
strongly held convictions and causes that might well be perceived
as unpopular by local juries and judges,20 and the circumstances
of the case illustrate the crippling potential of an unchecked def-
amation law in the United States.
B. Presidents, Patriots, and Preachers
To appreciate the importance of Sullivan , consider how in the
14 This is not to say there are no disincentives on plaintiffs and their lawyers under
the American system.  As Professor David Anderson has perceptively recognized,
other factors may discourage prospective litigants and their counsel, but Anderson’s
analysis was in the context of the Sullivan  world, which makes recovery more diffi-
cult, while I am surmising a world without Sullivan . See  Anderson, supra  note 4, at R
524-36.
15 See MILMO & ROGERs, supra  note 11, § 9.3 (explaining that for non-pecuniary R
losses, a maximum of about £200,000 can be awarded “for an outrageously bad case
of libel”).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
17 Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 256.
18 Id . at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring).
19 For a fascinating and in-depth look at New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , see
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW:  THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1991).
20 Consider, for example, the libel case brought by General William Westmore-
land against CBS, which concerned issues arising out of the Vietnam War, one of the
most difficult and painful chapters in our country’s history. See generally  Anthony
Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered:  Time To Return To “The Meaning
Of The First Amendment” , 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 626 (1983).
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1970s some of the Watergate conspirators might have used the
law of libel to deter reporting in the early stages of the Washing-
ton Post ’s investigation.  Sound farfetched?21  Perhaps not in
light of MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,22 a case that
demonstrates how much difference Sullivan  can make where a
plaintiff is bent on hiding the truth.  MMAR Group was a Texas
securities firm that was the subject of a Wall Street Journal  article
reporting on an ongoing state and federal investigation into the
propriety of the company’s dealings with the Louisiana State
Employees’ Retirement System and the alleged reckless and ex-
travagant use of client money.23  One month after the article was
published, and two days after being sued by the Louisiana retire-
ment system, MMAR went out of business and thereafter
brought a libel suit.24  The firm was ruled to be a private figure,
so in regard to its claim for actual injury, the Sullivan standard
did not apply, although the firm was required to prove falsity and
demonstrate negligence in accordance with the Court’s post-Sul-
livan holdings25 (which is, of course, more than would have been
required by the common law).  At trial, MMAR prevailed and
was awarded compensatory damages of $22.7 million.26  The firm
also was awarded punitive damages under the Sullivan  standard
in the amount of $200 million against Dow Jones,27 making this
the largest verdict in the history of media libel cases.28
Dow Jones moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.29
As to the compensatory damages claim, the court ruled without
particular difficulty that the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury’s findings of falsity and negligence, and it upheld the
21 Various efforts by the Nixon Administration to control or intimidate the press
through legal means, including the issuance of subpoenas, prosecution of press
sources, threats not to renew television licenses, and the imposition of prior re-
straints, are recounted in Professor David Anderson’s article on freedom of the
press. See  David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press , 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 523
(2002).
22 987 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
23 Media Law Resource Center, MLRC 2004 REPORT ON TRIAL AND DAMAGES,
Feb. 2004, at 63 [hereinafter MLRC 2004 REPORT].
24 Id .
25 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (placing bur-
den on plaintiff to prove falsity);  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(requiring, at minimum, that a private figure plaintiff prove negligence).
26 MMAR Group, Inc. , 987 F. Supp at 538.
27 Id . at 549.
28 MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 63. R
29 MMAR Group, Inc. , 987 F. Supp. at 536.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 6  3-MAY-05 13:56
1208 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
award.30  Punitive damages were a different story.  Here the
heightened Sullivan standard applied, and the court found there
simply was not enough evidence that Dow Jones had acted with
actual malice.31
The proceedings in the trial court likely would have ended
here but for an unexpected development bearing an eerie paral-
lel to the events of Watergate.  MMAR apparently had an exten-
sive taping system that it used in connection with its business.32
While Dow Jones’s appeal was pending, the Wall Street Journal
was approached by a former member of MMAR who disclosed
that principals in the firm had withheld or destroyed various tape
recordings of conversations that cast serious doubt on MMAR’s
claim that key parts of the Journal ’s article was false.33  As a re-
sult, the trial court reopened the case under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(3), vacated the verdict, and ordered a new trial
on the grounds that MMAR’s misconduct had seriously
prejudiced the newspaper’s ability to defend itself on the issue of
falsity.34
So what does this case tell us about Watergate?  First, it vividly
demonstrates how much easier it is for someone intent on hiding
facts that bear on the truth to prevail when Sullivan ’s heightened
protection is inapplicable.  The issue of truth largely was in con-
trol of the plaintiff in the MMAR case, and but for the fortuity of
a former member of the firm coming forward, Dow Jones would
likely have been deprived of an important defense.  Actual mal-
ice was a different matter.  The facts surrounding that determina-
tion were within the sphere of Dow Jones’s own knowledge, and
it was able to defend itself more effectively regardless of what the
plaintiff had done.  Had Sullivan  not eroded the common law,
punitive damages likely would have been available under a very
different and less stringent standard of common law malice, re-
quiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate some kind of ill will or
30 Id . at 538-42.
31 Id . at 542-44.  The court did find that the reporter acted with actual malice, but
because most of the punitive award ran against Dow Jones and it had not authorized
or ratified any wrongful conduct, the bulk of the award was thrown out. Id . at 544-
45.
32 MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co. , 187 F.R.D. 282, 286-89 (S.D. Tex.
1999).
33 Id . at 286.
34 Id . at 282.
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hostility.35
Getting back to Watergate, this might have meant, for exam-
ple, that all of the Washington Post ’s editorials critical of Presi-
dent Nixon and his administration were fair game to show the
Post ’s hostility.36  Or equally troubling, had the Post  continued
aggressively to pursue the story after suit was filed, might the
plaintiffs have been able to offer that fact as evidence in support
of a punitive claim?37  One can imagine that Woodward and
Bernstein cajoled, pushed, and even threatened sources to dis-
lodge the information they acquired, and one can only wonder
how their tactics might have been viewed in a world without Sul-
livan , which makes this kind of argument largely obsolete.38
Second, questions like truth and common law malice do not
ordinarily lend themselves to the kind of searching post-trial re-
view that the Sullivan  standard does.  With Sullivan , unlike with
the common law,39 comes the requirement that actual malice be
proved by clear and convincing evidence40 and that reviewing
courts conduct a searching independent review of the record to
make sure the constitutional standard has been met.41  The net
effect of these differences is that plaintiffs seeking to use libel as
a means to hide the truth would likely have had a greater chance
of winning a verdict and defending it on appeal under the com-
mon law than they do with the Sullivan rule.42
These same concerns come into play even where someone is
35 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:  LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS, § 10.3.5 (3d ed. 2004)
36 Cf . Corporate Training Unlimited, Inc. v. NBC, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 112, 124
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that reporter’s alleged “ill will” had no bearing on the
actual malice inquiry, which “refers to a defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of the
defamatory statements or a reckless disregard concerning their truth, not to any sub-
jective ill will it may have borne the plaintiff”).
37 Cf . Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury News, 216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 186 (Ct. App.
1989) (holding that a finding of a reporter being aggressive and abrasive does not
establish actual malice).
38 See id .
39 Where First Amendment rules are not involved, reviewing courts generally ap-
ply the more deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review to questions of fact.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1984).
40 See  Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.  Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2
(1989).
41 See Bose , 466 U.S. at 511.
42 The MLRC study shows that between 1980 and 2003, almost half of all libel
verdicts won by plaintiffs have been reversed or modified on appeal. See MLRC
2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 45 tbl. 18. R
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not trying to hide the truth, but instead the truth is simply in
dispute.  As Justice Harlan once pointed out, “[I]n many areas
which are at the center of public debate ‘truth’ is not a readily
identifiable concept.”43  Take, for example, the celebrated litiga-
tion in the 1980s between CBS and General William Westmore-
land.44  The General had sued CBS over a documentary
suggesting that Westmoreland and the military had “cooked” en-
emy casualty figures during the Vietnam War.45  The story was
controversial and subject to a great deal of criticism.46  In re-
sponse, CBS conducted its own internal review of its reporting,
concluding that a number of CBS policies had been violated in
preparation of the report.47  Nevertheless, CBS believed the re-
port to have been essentially correct and stood by it.48  West-
moreland then sued for libel.49
Westmoreland v. CBS  has often been cited as an example of
the inadequacies of the Sullivan  rule.  CBS was put to the enor-
mous expense of an unnecessary trial on an issue about which
our own government could not even agree during the war, and
which in all likelihood was not subject to definitive proof either
way.50 This criticism is valid and does, in fact, highlight weak-
nesses in the Sullivan  doctrine.  But what might have happened
without Sullivan?  During trial, Westmoreland ultimately gave
up and dismissed his case in return for what one of his lawyers
has described as a “sort of wishy-washy statement about leaving
everything to history.”51  This happened, of course, precisely be-
cause of the barriers imposed by Sullivan . Notwithstanding the
serious criticisms identified by CBS in its own evaluation of the
43 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).




48 Id .  The Westmoreland  case, including the events leading to the trial, is exten-
sively and critically chronicled by Renata Adler in her book RECKLESS DISREGARD.
See generally RENATA ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986).
49 See Westmoreland , 601 F. Supp. at 67.
50 See LEWIS, supra  note 19, at 609-11, 620.  For another decision where the likely R
inability to prove definitively the truth or falsity of a broadcast redounded in the
broadcaster’s favor, see Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes , 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995).
51 David Dorsen, Lecture at Duke University, Westmoreland v. CBS , at 8 (1998),
at  http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/dewitt/papers/archive/27/27_2.doc (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2005); see BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON’T SHOOT THE MESSENGER 12
(1999).
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report, Westmoreland faced serious obstacles to success in his lit-
igation, including proving falsity and actual malice.52  Had the
protections of Sullivan been unavailable, CBS would have had to
prove truth—a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking—and it
would not have been protected from liability by the argument
that, despite the flaws, its report was broadcast only after a de-
tailed and considered investigation.  In these circumstances, it
seems reasonable to suggest that Westmoreland might not have
given up nearly so easily—or cheaply.
Finally, in the absence of Sullivan , consider how prominent or
powerful figures might have used libel and other torts to suppress
criticism about them.  In the 1980s, Jerry Falwell was deeply of-
fended by a parody published by Larry Flynt and Hustler maga-
zine.53  The parody and the publication were without doubt
offensive, and Falwell sued both for libel and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.54  A jury ruled in Falwell’s favor on
the emotional distress claim,55 and but for the Court’s extension
of the Sullivan  principle to that claim, he likely would have suc-
ceeded.56  One of the key arguments advanced in the various
amicus briefs and adopted by the Supreme Court was the poten-
tial for claims such as Falwell’s to deter political criticism, partic-
ularly in the form of editorial cartoons and the like.57  Just
recently we have seen a striking example in Canada, which of
course has rejected the Sullivan  standard,58 of how those kinds of
concerns can operate.  Conrad Black, the fallen Canadian media
baron who has been the subject of a great deal of critical report-
ing both in the United States and elsewhere59 over the collapse
of his publishing empire, has sued Toronto Life  magazine over an
article entitled “A Toast to Lord Black on His Arrival in Hell,”
which was illustrated with a drawing of him pulling into Hades in
52 See Westmoreland , 601 F. Supp. at 68.
53 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
54 Id . at 48-49.
55 Id . at 49.
56 See id . at 52-53.
57 Id.  at 53-55.
58 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, *51 n.211
(“[T]here is no need to amend or alter the common law . . . the ‘actual malice’ rule
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan  . . . should
not be adopted into the Canadian common law of defamation.”).
59 See, e.g. , Canadian Broadcasting Company, Conrad Black:  Lager-heir to
London lord , Nov. 13, 2003, at  http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/black_conrad
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
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a convertible, and giving a thumbs up to those with whom he
would soon be suffering.60
The point of all this is not to demonstrate that Sullivan  is per-
fect—it isn’t—or even that it works well most of the time.  It has,
however, had a profound, and in my view positive, impact in pro-
tecting many forms of valuable expression which, under the com-
mon law, or even a less protective constitutional standard, might
have been subject to considerable liability.  And as I now shift
my perspective to look at how Sullivan  is working today, I do not




It is easy to forget that the serious debate in the Sullivan deci-
sion was not over whether instituting an actual malice standard
would provide too much protection for the press, but rather
whether that standard provided too little.  The Court’s decision
in favor of the New York Times  and the individual defendants
was unanimous.  Three Justices—Black, Douglas, and
Goldberg—concurred that any rule allowing government offi-
cials to sue for libel did not go far enough.61  One of their princi-
pal concerns was that the risks and costs associated with the
litigation process itself would have a significant deterrent effect
on expression.62  The experience of the last twenty-five years
shows that these Justices were prescient.
A. Mega Verdicts, Pricey Lawyers, and Beyond
The Media Law Resource Center (MLRC), a media industry
trade group, has tracked media libel trials since 1980.63  When
the tracking began, it was generally acknowledged that media li-
bel litigation had reached crisis proportions as the result of “a
dramatic proliferation of highly publicized libel actions brought
by well-known figures who seek, and often receive, staggering
60 See  Mark A. Stein, And the Retort:  Go to Court , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004,
Business Section at 2.
61 See  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (Black, J., joined by Doug-
las, J., concurring); id . at 297 (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in the
result).
62 See id . at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring); id . at 302-03 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
63 MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 1. R
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sums of money.”64  The ongoing study now contains data on 503
libel trials over a twenty-five year period,65 and although the cur-
rent state of affairs does not seem quite so acute, serious con-
cerns remain.
Over the period, plaintiffs have prevailed just under sixty per-
cent of the time even where the elevated Sullivan  standard ap-
plies.66  In all trials, the average damage award has been just over
$2.25 million, with a median of $300,000.67  While it is true that
many of these initial verdicts are reversed or modified on appeal,
this is not always the case.68  Eight of the ten largest verdicts
against the media arose out of libel cases, and within this group
of eight, five involved news reporting on government or some
other public issue.69  These five verdicts ranged from just over
$19 million to $222.7 million, and three of them were sustained
on appeal.70
In Sprague v. Walter ,71 an assistant district attorney in Phila-
delphia was the subject of four articles in the Philadelphia In-
quirer  which, among other things, suggested that Sprague
obstructed a homicide case to permit the son of a friend to es-
cape prosecution, and also interfered with an investigation of
Pennsylvania state police officers.72  A jury found in favor of
Sprague, a public official under Sullivan , and awarded him $2.5
million in compensatory damages and $31.5 million in punitive
damages.73  The appellate court affirmed the verdict, left the
compensatory award intact, and remitted the punitive award to a
mere $21.5 million.74  Thereafter the case was settled for a re-
64 Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware:  The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel , 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996-97
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of
Defamation:  Putting the Horse Behind the Cart,  35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 24-28 (1985).
65 MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra note 23, at 1. R
66 Id.  at 23 tbl. 5.
67 Id.  at 28 tbl. 8.  These figures exclude MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co .,
987 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Tex. 1997), which, as discussed above, represents the largest
verdict in history. MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 63.  If MMAR Group, R
Inc.  is included, the average jumps to over $3 million, but the median does not
change. Id . at 28 tbl. 8.
68 See MLRC 2004 Report, supra note 23, at 45 tbl. 8.
69 See id . at 63-68.
70 Id .
71 656 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
72 Id . at 897.
73 Id . at 896.
74 Id . at 930.
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ported $20 million.75
In a similar vein is Feazell v. A.H. Belo Corp .,76 another case
involving a district attorney, this time originating in Texas.  In
Feazell , a Dallas television station aired a report that the plaintiff
was lax in prosecuting drug cases and may have taken bribes in
drunk-driving cases.77  Two years later, the plaintiff was indicted
on federal racketeering and bribery charges, was tried, and was
acquitted.78  Thereafter he resigned, went into private practice,
and sued the television station for libel.79  The jury awarded him
$58 million, and the case was settled prior to appeal.80
The third case, Srivastava v. Harte-Hanks , was brought by a
heart surgeon named Srivastava after a television station re-
ported that his hospital privileges had been revoked and that he
may have mishandled several cases.81  After the jury awarded
him $29 million in compensatory and punitive damages, the case
was settled before appeal for $8.5 million.82
Of the two cases where verdicts were reversed, one, MMAR
Group, Inc. , was initially sustained as to the $22.7 million com-
pensatory damages award, but later was dismissed when, fortui-
tously, the defendant learned that plaintiff had withheld or
destroyed critical evidence.83  Only one of the five largest ver-
dicts was dismissed outright on appeal.84
If these cases involved media conduct that was exceptionally
bad, where there was clear evidence of calculated falsehood, one
might be tempted to ignore or at least diminish the experience as
aberrational.  Particularly troubling is that in each of these cases,
the huge verdicts were sustained under circumstances where one
can at least reasonably question whether the applicable standards
were satisfied.  In Sprague , for example, the case for actual mal-
ice centered not on any hard evidence of calculated falsehood,
75 SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 175. R
76 Feazell v. A.H. Belo Corp., No. 86-22271 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Apr. 19, 1991).




81 Id . at 65.
82 Id .
83 987 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
84 See  Newton v. NBC, Inc., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990).  NBC’s victory here
came at a considerable price; legal fees to defend the case are reported to have
amounted to $9 million. See DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER PUBLICITY AND THE
ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 130 (1992).
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but rather on the alleged animosity the reporter harbored against
the plaintiff and certain personal problems the reporter had en-
dured.85  Although the Feazell  decision was not appealed, and
there is no reported decision, it is interesting to note that a find-
ing of actual malice was made notwithstanding that after the re-
port was broadcast a prosecutor thought the evidence strong
enough to justify an indictment and trial.86  In MMAR , the sub-
sequently discovered evidence strongly suggested that the most
critical defamatory statements had actually been true,87 while in
the Shrivastava case, much of the reporting was based on confi-
dential medical reports that had been secretly given to the re-
porter by the defendant’s secretary.88  This is not to suggest that
the reporting in these cases was without problems, but it cer-
tainly was not indefensible, whereas true calculated falsehood is.
Verdicts, of course, do not tell the whole story of the risks asso-
ciated with libel litigation after Sullivan .89  Even where the de-
fendant is largely successful, the success often comes at a very
high price.90  Defense of the Westmoreland  case discussed earlier
is reported to have cost CBS more than $3.5 million in attorneys’
fees.91 The Washington Post  is reported to have spent around $2
million defending itself against a libel case brought by former
Mobil Oil president William Tavoulareas.92  NBC is said to have
spent $9 million defending a libel suit brought by the entertainer
Wayne Newton.93  More recently, ABC settled a libel case
brought by tobacco companies over a story reporting that they
85 Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  It is also notewor-
thy that the Sprague  case arose out of an article published by one of the most
respected newspapers in the country, The Philadelphia Inquirer , which, at the time,
was edited by one of the newspaper industry’s most highly regarded editors, Eugene
Roberts. See SANFORD, supra note 51, at 98.  Roberts himself played a role in the R
articles concerning Mr. Sprague. See Sprague , 656 A.2d at 908.
86 See MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 63. R
87 See  MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 F.R.D. 282, 288-89 (S.D. Tex.
1999).
88 MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 65. R
89 For a comprehensive examination of the risks and costs associated with libel
litigation—both as to plaintiffs and defendants—see Anderson, supra note 4, at 510- R
36.
90 See  Levine, supra note 64, at 28-32. R
91 See Anderson, supra note 4, at 542 n.218.  Estimates of the costs in Westmore- R
land’s case run as high as $10 million. See Kevin L. Kite, Incremental Identities:
Libel-Proof Plaintiffs, Substantial Truth, and the Future of the Incremental Harm
Doctrine , 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 529 n.2 (1998).
92 SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 4. R
93 See supra  note 61. R
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had manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes during the
manufacturing process.  The case was settled when ABC agreed
to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, which are reported to have
been $15 million.94
Fees for outside counsel again do not tell the whole story.
Over the last fifteen or so years there has been a significant
change in the role of inside counsel as well.  When I joined CNN
in early 1991, I was the first CNN lawyer whose central responsi-
bility was to clear stories before they aired.  By the time I left the
network in 2000, there were five lawyers (in addition to me) who
focused on pre-broadcast review.  In my experience, CNN was
not unusual; other television news operations had as many if not
more lawyers clearing stories in advance of broadcast, and print
organizations also have a bevy of counsel reviewing stories
before publication.95  There is, of course, a significant cost issue
associated with employing all of these lawyers, but that is not the
only change.  When I first started practicing in this area, it was
generally acknowledged that lawyers were not editors and should
stay out of the editorial process.  Over the years, I heard less and
less about this separation, and my sense is that lawyers today are
far more involved in the editorial process than they used to be.96
While this may be a good thing for minimizing liability,97 I am
not so sure it is a good thing for journalism.98
B. Why We Should Care
There is a temptation to dismiss all this as something the media
94 See  Frontline, Anatomy of a Decision , at  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/
frontline/smoke/cron.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
95 For example, every issue of Time  is read cover-to-cover by a lawyer before it is
published.
96 See  Neil Hickey, The Lawyers:  How They Can Help Us, How They Can Hurt
Us , COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Sept./Oct. 2000, at 1 (“Now more than ever, lawyers
are becoming part of the editorial process.”).
97 As to the liability side, the MLRC study suggests that in the 1990s the media
did better in litigation than it did in the 1980s, and since 2000 it appears to be doing
better than it did in the 1990s, although there is not enough data yet to draw strong
conclusions on this latter point.  I suspect there are many reasons for this, including
a more active and extensive role for counsel in the pre-broadcast or pre-publication
review process.
98 See  David A. Anderson, Libel and Self-Censorship , 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 438-
41 (1975) (discussing “personal and professional factors that tend to make the law-
yer a poor censor”); Hickey, supra  note 96, at 1-5 (discussing how lawyers can affect R
journalism).  The Supreme Court’s admonition in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo , 418 U.S. 241 (1974), that editors, not judges, should determine what goes
into a newspaper would seem to apply with equal force to lawyers.
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has brought upon itself.  Over the twenty-five years covered by
the MLRC study, American news media has become increasingly
concentrated in the hands of big, powerful, and profitable com-
panies that, it can be said, are able to afford these costs and are
unlikely to be deterred by verdicts and attorneys’ bills which pale
in comparison to the companies’ revenues and net worth.99  To
make matters worse, one can certainly make a case that in gen-
eral the quality of reporting has not been on the rise.  Over the
last decade, or more, we have seen continuing erosion of the dis-
tinction between news and entertainment100 and between news
and advertising.101  The public views news organizations as exces-
sively focused on prurient, salacious, or sensational stories to the
detriment of more important but less exciting or titillating re-
ports (although, of course, the public may not be as interested in
reading about or watching reports on these more serious issues).
The media certainly does not help itself when, for example, it
acts as if there is nothing more important in the world than what
happened at the O.J. Simpson trial—or more recently, Michael
Jackson’s fiasco du jour.102  And the current fascination with “re-
ality” television, while a ratings booster, certainly does not in-
spire us to shout the words of the First Amendment from our
rooftops.103
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for not ignoring the risks
99 In Don’t Shoot The Messenger , Bruce Sanford argues persuasively that the pub-
lic’s perception of the media as being more about making money than making good
journalism is the key ingredient in the propensity of judges and juries to reject First
Amendment defenses and award sizeable verdicts to plaintiffs in libel cases. See
SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 93-112. R
100 See, e.g ., Smolla, supra  note 64, at 11 (describing as one factor in the prolifera- R
tion of libel litigation, “the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between the in-
forming and entertaining functions of the media”); Broadcasting and Cable, News
for Sale? , Jan. 26, 2004 (discussing NBC offer for interview with Michael Jackson as
“newsfotainment”).
101 See, e.g. , David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press , 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 460-
66 (2002); Stuart Elliott, Advertising , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at C12 (discussing
appearance of sponsors’ products on CNN news program).
102 See SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 39-45. R
103 One particularly disastrous manifestation of the reality craze that has done
little to enhance the public’s view of the press has been the recent experience with
media ride-alongs, where the press accompanies law enforcement onto private prop-
erty during police or other official action. See SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 123-49. R
Courts have been highly critical of media ride-alongs. See  Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F.
Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d , 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514
U.S. 1062 (1995).  The Supreme Court has declared the practice to be a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, at least where press entry on private property is involved.
See  Wilson v. Lane, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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and costs that persist notwithstanding Sullivan , even if the media
may at times be its own worst enemy.  First, however one might
generalize about American news media today, it is equally true
that many of the large verdicts and expensive litigation we have
seen involve important reporting.  Reports like I discussed ear-
lier on alleged political corruption, incompetent doctors, and dis-
honest money managers all involve serious issues of public
concern.104  Second, speech is not like most other products.  A
particular kind of car, for example, has certain basic characteris-
tics that are relatively fixed, and the costs and benefits of produc-
ing it are subject to relatively precise measurement.  On the
other hand, the costs and benefits of producing and disseminat-
ing a particular piece of information are both more difficult to
measure and to realize.  With every newspaper edition, television
news broadcast, or internet website, editors and producers face a
wide range of daily choices about what to include or exclude, and
without much notice might well tend to avoid reporting that
which is likely to bring with it potential exposure to significant
liability or defense costs.  Noted First Amendment attorney
Floyd Abrams has recognized how particularly insidious this
problem is because it is so difficult to detect:
If news organizations let up a bit, no one would ever know it—
newspapers, screens would still be filled with news.  The sort
of reporting that is libel-risky is the sort of material that serves
the public in a unique way.  If the press lets up, I’m afraid the
public will never know what it has lost.105
104 Speech on matters of public concern lies “at the heart of the First Amend-
ment’s protection.”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 759 (1985) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978)); see  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (discussing the settled
“general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by
the First Amendment”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (“Freedom of
discussion . . . must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appro-
priate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period.”).
105 Fred W. Friendly, After the Westmoreland Case:  How Can the People Talk
Back?, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1985, at A21 (quoting Floyd Abrams); see  Levine,
supra  note 64, at 30, n.125 (“It is, of course, impossible to document those instances R
in which the press declines to publish specific stories or investigate particular issues
or events because of a fear of defamation litigation.  Nevertheless, common sense, as
well as the candid admissions of editors, reporters, and their counsel, all indicate
that debate on public issues has indeed been dampened.”); Anderson, supra  note 98, R
at 429-38 (discussing immeasurable nature of press self-censorship due to threat of
litigation); Michael Massing, The Libel Chill:  How Cold Is It Out There? , COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1985, at 31 (concluding after interviews with 150 edi-
tors, reporters, and press lawyers that “a chill has indeed set in”).
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Moreover, the economic value derived from any particular edi-
torial decision is likely to be more diffused106 than with other
products, so a publisher may have less incentive to take risks
than the distributor of more tangible products.107  Third, libel law
does not just apply to big media; it equally affects the small play-
ers as well: alternative newspapers, bloggers, or citizens pro-
testing the actions of their governors or others in a position of
power.108  Indeed, in agreeing to review this term its first libel
case in fourteen years,109 the Supreme Court will consider the
propriety of an injunction against a disgruntled former client who
was found to have defamed the prominent lawyer Johnnie
Cochran through public protest.110
C. What Went Wrong?
What is it then about the Sullivan  standard that permits this
state of affairs to persist?  There are numerous possible explana-
tions,111 but I propose to focus on two: the difficulty in determin-
ing when Sullivan applies in the first place and problems in the
application of the actual malice standard itself.
1. Nailing the Jellyfish
The Sullivan  case started us down the road of distinguishing
between libel plaintiffs based on their government status or
prominence in controversial social affairs.  The law today pro-
vides that public plaintiffs—public officials and public figures—
cannot prevail in a libel case without proving the Sullivan  form
106 This is so because as a public good, “the benefits of information cannot be
restricted to direct purchasers but inevitably spread to larger groups.”  Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance:  Public Choice and the First Amendment , 105
HARV. L. REV. 554, 558 (1991).  The inability to realize the full economic value of
particular speech is likely to lead publishers to produce less information than is so-
cially optimal. See id . at 558-59.
107 See id . at 568-70.
108 Cf ., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (recognizing that First
Amendment considerations apply to the “lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as of
the large metropolitan publisher”).  The use of libel law to deter citizen protest was
first documented by Professors Canan and Pring in their seminal study of what they
dubbed Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. See GEORGE W. PRING &
PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS:  GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).
109 The Supreme Court’s last libel decision was Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc ., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
110 See Cochran v. Tory, No. B159437, 2003 WL 22451378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003),
cert. granted , 125 S. Ct. 26 (2004).
111 There is a great deal of in-depth scholarship on the causes of the increasing
threat that libel has posed over the last twenty years. See generally supra  note 4.
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of actual malice, whereas, at least as to claims seeking compensa-
tion for actual injury, private plaintiffs are held to a far less de-
manding standard, usually negligence.112  This determination,
whether the plaintiff is public or private, is a critical question in
any libel case, and can affect the entire course of the litigation.113
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its importance to any litiga-
tion, it is often quite difficult to predict with any certainty how a
court will view a plaintiff.  One court likened the determination
to “nail[ing] a jellyfish to the wall.”114  The leading treatise on the
subject describes the law as “chaotic.”115
Sullivan  itself was not so much concerned with the status of
the plaintiff as it was with the underlying importance of safe-
guarding “a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues  should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open.”116  It was only later that the distinction between public
and private plaintiffs began to crystallize, and for a time the
Court appeared to be moving in a different direction.  Two years
after the Sullivan  decision, the basic rule of the case was ex-
tended to prominent plaintiffs who were not government offi-
cials—individuals the Court deemed public figures.117  Shortly
thereafter, a plurality of the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.118 determined that the Sullivan actual malice standard
should apply to all reporting on matters of public or general con-
cern.119  Several years later, however, a majority of the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc .120 rejected this approach, firmly es-
tablishing the distinction between public and private libel
litigants.121
This might have been fine had the court approached the pub-
lic/private distinction broadly in a way that comported with the
underlying values of Sullivan .  Unfortunately, it has not.  Instead,
the Court has taken a “narrow and rigid approach”122 to the dis-
112 See  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
113 See SACK, supra  note 35, § 5.4.2. R
114 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d,
580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
115 SACK, supra  note 35, § 5.3.1. R
116 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
117 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
118 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
119 See id . at 44-45.
120 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
121 See id . at 347-48.
122 Smolla, supra  note 64, at 54. R
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tinction, applying Gertz in a “dismally mechanistic”123 way which
has sown confusion in the lower courts.  In at least two of its
three public-figure cases decided since Gertz , the Court has re-
fused to accord public-figure status under circumstances clearly
implicating precisely the kind of issues that are at the heart of
Sullivan .124
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association  arose from a book enti-
tled KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents , which listed
the plaintiff, Ilya Wolston, as one of a group of “Soviet agents
identified in the United States” who had been “convicted of espi-
onage or falsifying information or perjury and/or contempt
charges following espionage indictments.”125  The basis for the
charges was an espionage case Wolston had become embroiled in
involving his aunt and uncle.126  In that case Wolston was subpoe-
naed, failed to appear, and ultimately was held in contempt for
his failure.127  The book was in error in reporting that Wolston
had been indicted for espionage.128  Despite the subject matter of
the book involving an issue of vital public concern and Wolston’s
activities being related to that issue, the Court held that he was
not a public figure.129  In Hutchinson v. Proxmire ,130 the issue,
though not nearly so weighty, still concerned the operation of
government.  A scientist who sought and received federal grant
money to study emotional responses in certain kinds of animals
was the unhappy recipient of Senator William Proxmire’s
“Golden Fleece of the Month Award,” which targeted what the
senator viewed as wasteful public spending.131  Again, notwith-
standing the direct relationship of the subject matter to a core
function of government, the Court rejected public figure status
for Hutchinson.132  These cases are difficult to reconcile with Sul-
123 Id.  at 51.
124 In my view, the Court’s third public-figure decision is also highly debatable.
But since it involved issues that arguably are further removed from Sullivan , I do
not include it. See  Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Smolla, supra  note
64, at 51-54. R
125 443 U.S. 157, 159 (1979).  The correct title of the book is KGB:  The Secret
Work of Soviet Secret Agents .  The Supreme Court in Wolston  misidentified it as
KGB, the Secret Work of Soviet Agents . See id .
126 443 U.S. at 161-62.
127 Id . at 162-63.
128 Id . at 160.
129 Id . at 166-68.
130 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
131 Id . at 114.
132 Id . at 133-36.
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livan .  Both concerned important public issues—espionage and
wasteful government spending—and both involved plaintiffs who
were undeniably involved in those issues, however reluctantly.
Not only do these decisions represent a cramped view of Sulli-
van , but they demonstrate another problem with the public/ pri-
vate distinction: it often bears little relationship to how reporters
actually do their jobs.  Although some kinds of stories may be
chosen precisely because of the plaintiff’s prominence in soci-
ety,133 reporting is more often driven by reader or viewer interest
and the importance of an issue to the audience.  Whatever its
shortcomings, however, this distinction has become firmly en-
trenched in the constitutional law of defamation, and there is lit-
tle prospect that the Court would be willing to reconsider the
wisdom of its approach.  Nevertheless, I offer a modest sugges-
tion that in some instances might reduce the tension between
Sullivan  and the Court’s more recent approach to libel.
a. Neutral Reporting
My suggestion involves a doctrine know as the neutral report-
age privilege, which was first articulated by the Second Circuit in
Edwards v. National Audubon Society134 to protect, without re-
gard to a publisher’s motivation, the disinterested reporting of
defamatory accusations involving an issue of public concern lev-
eled by a credible source and attributed to that source.  As ap-
plied by the Second Circuit, the privilege was limited to
accusations against a public official or figure, but it has been ap-
plied more broadly to private figures as well.135  The privilege has
not been widely adopted and, in fact, has been rejected by sev-
eral courts.136  Nevertheless, one leading scholar has remarked
that in the right circumstances, most jurisdictions would likely
apply it.137
133 Celebrity gossip reports on, for example, Britney Spears’ latest marriage or
Courtney Love’s public outbursts are certainly driven by public interest in particular
personalities, not the importance of the underlying issues.  Ironically, though, not-
withstanding that this kind of reporting involves issues of less importance than those
involved in cases like Wolston  and Proxmire , most of the celebrities subject to gossip
reports are public figures. See generally SACK, supra  note 35, § 5.3.11.1. R
134 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied , 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
135 See  April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
136 See, e.g.,  Dickey v. CBS, 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978); McCall v. Courier-
Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied , 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Hogan v. Her-
ald Co., 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982).
137 Anderson, supra note 4, at 503-04 (explaining that, for example, courts would R
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The concept of neutral reportage was designed to solve the
problem created by Sullivan ’s actual malice standard when the
press simply reports allegations that are newsworthy but which
the publisher may not believe to be true.138  Under Sullivan , such
reporting, which is commonplace, could be subject to liability be-
cause, absent constitutional protection, the common law imposes
the same liability on a republisher as it does on the originator of
a defamation.139  In some form, it seems to me, neutral reportage
might offer a sort of middle ground between Rosenbloom  and
some of the more cramped post-Gertz  public figure cases without
signaling a return to the now-discredited broad notions of Rosen-
bloom .  First, unlike the public figure-private figure distinction,
neutral reportage focuses squarely on the core responsibility of
the press to report on matters of public concern.140  The press
does this all the time without regard to whether the underlying
accusations are true, and in many contexts it does so without any
fear of liability.  Reporting on court proceedings, the conduct of
public meetings, and a host of other government activities all in-
volve the press function of informing the public about what is
being said by others about a particular subject or controversy.
Libel law widely recognizes a privilege to make fair and accurate
reports on such matters regardless of whether the press actually
believes the charges or whether they are made about a person
who is prominent or engaged in public affairs.141  It does so be-
cause of a belief in the underlying importance of the public’s
knowing about these kinds of public issues, not because of any
confidence that the reported accusations are true or made by a
responsible person.  Indeed, so fundamental is this belief that the
fair-reports privilege is now likely required by the First
Amendment.142
It does not seem like a big leap to get from the idea that we
should permit accurate and neutral reporting on government af-
fairs to the idea of shielding similar kinds of reporting on impor-
tant public issues that may not so directly involve the
“surely” hold that the media could safely report a baseless allegation by the Presi-
dent of the United States that the Vice President was plotting to assassinate him
even if the publisher did not believe the charge).
138 See Edwards , 556 F.2d at 120.
139 See SACK, supra  note 35, §2.7.1. R
140 See Edwards , 556 F.2d at 120.
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
142 See  Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975).
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government.  This is particularly so in a society like ours, which
values private enterprise above government assistance, and
which is more willing to trust to the private sector matters that in
other places are more heavily infiltrated by government.143  It is
certainly true that there are interests involved in reporting on
government proceedings that do not necessarily apply to the pri-
vate sector, but this is not always the case, and appropriate devel-
opment of the neutral reportage concept could account for these
differences.  Without recognition of some form of neutral report-
age, we will likely continue to see the kind of strange results
wrought by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s latest libel
decision.
This decision, Norton v. Glenn144, arose out of offensive and
outrageous remarks made by one town council member about
the town’s mayor and the president of the council.145  The state-
ments were made both during council meetings and outside of
the council chamber.146  The outbursts were reported, in context,
by the local newspaper, which also quoted the mayor as describ-
ing the comments as bizarre and suggesting that the person utter-
ing them needed help.147  The mayor and council president sued
both the council member who made the statements and the
newspaper for libel, but only in regard to the statements made
143 For example, retirement savings and health care in the United States are to a
greater extent handled through private sector transactions than in many other coun-
tries.  Yet these issues are of no less vital concern to the public here than they are
elsewhere.  Cf . Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring), explaining that:
Increasingly, in this country, the distinctions between governmental and
private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of the 1930’s and World
War II there has been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a
merging of science, industry, and government, and a high degree of interac-
tion between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds . . . .
While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of govern-
mental power, power has also become more organized in what we have
commonly considered to be the private sector.  In many situations, policy
determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political
institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array
of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some
only loosely connected with the Government.
144 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
145 The remarks included charges that the council president and mayor were
“queers” and “child molesters,” that they had conducted a homosexual affair, and
that they had made inappropriate sexual overtures to and conspired against the
council member defendant. Id . at 60 (Castille, J. concurring).
146 Id.  at 50.
147 Id.
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outside the council chamber.148  The remarks made during coun-
sel meetings were clearly not actionable as to the newspaper be-
cause of the Pennsylvania fair reports privilege.149  The trial court
held that neutral reportage applied to the newspaper’s report
and a jury returned a verdict against the council member but in
favor of the newspaper.150  The originator of the defamation did
not appeal.  The subjects appealed as to the newspaper only.  Re-
jecting the neutral reportage doctrine, the superior court re-
versed the jury verdict, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed that ruling.151  The odd state of affairs—and the consti-
tutional deficiencies—created by this reversal were aptly summa-
rized in Justice Castille’s concurring opinion:
I am concerned also with the practical difficulties the press will
encounter in trying to walk the very fine line between accu-
rately reporting public governance—related comments such as
these, while avoiding liability for doing so.  Absent a privilege,
the newspaper may be forced to sanitize the report or resort to
vagaries—highly subjective changes which inevitably will op-
erate to mislead the public as to the seriousness or rashness of
the accusations.  Moreover, by forcing newspapers to
recharacterize what actually occurred, the absence of a privi-
lege essentially requires the substitution of editorial opinion
for accurate transcription.  Such a transformation of the actual
event inevitably alters its context and content.  In addition to
being inaccurate, news reports altered for fear of litigation
would be of far lesser value to the general public in learning of
and passing upon the appropriateness of the public behavior
of their elected officials.  Such a stilted reporting regime would
contravene the United States Supreme Court’s seminal state-
ment that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials.”152
My aim here is not to define with precision how the neutral
148 Id .
149 See id . at 63 (Castille, J., concurring).
150 Id.  at 51.
151 Although purporting to reject neutral reportage because it believed the United
States Supreme Court would not adopt such a privilege, the court’s articulated rea-
soning was based only on the absence of any decision by the Supreme Court in favor
of adopting the doctrine. See id . at 53-57.  Of course, the same thing could have
been said about actual malice before Sullivan  was decided, and the absence of any
decision on the point hardly constitutes a basis for rejection.
152 Id . at 60 (Castille, J., concurring).  Regrettably, Justice Castille did not follow
his own reasoning to its logical conclusion.  Instead, he concurred in the result by
passing the proverbial judicial buck, reasoning that such a privilege “should origi-
nate with the High Court.” Id .
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 24  3-MAY-05 13:56
1226 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
reportage privilege might work in all cases, but only to suggest
that if we are truly serious about the values embodied in Sulli-
van , it is an approach that should be considered in the right
circumstances.
2. The Hot Dog Factory
The second problem with Sullivan  has to do with the inconsis-
tent and often flawed interpretation and application of the actual
malice standard.  To understand why this is so, it may be helpful
first to consider the similarities between journalism and hot dogs.
Both involve something that at least many of us want to con-
sume—both nourish us and satisfy certain basic psychic needs.
Yet it may also be true that we don’t want to know too much
about how either is made.  Unfortunately, however, the Sullivan
actual malice standard forces us to spend a good deal of time
looking at how journalism is made, which isn’t always pretty and
often may lead to the wrong considerations influencing the out-
come of a case.
Justice Brennan clearly intended the actual malice standard to
be limited to very bad conduct—conduct amounting to “calcu-
lated falsehood”153—and in the early years after Sullivan , the
standard appeared to be applied that way.154  More recently,
however, despite using language that sounds true to the original
understanding of Sullivan , courts often transform the inquiry
into something that more resembles a general bad conduct and
elevated professional malpractice standard.  Impetus for this ap-
proach has come from Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton ,155 the Court’s most recent pronouncement on Sul-
livan ’s actual malice standard.  The Connaughton  Court re-
viewed a Sixth Circuit decision finding actual malice based
largely on two circumstances: that the newspaper’s publication
was an “extreme departure from professional standards” and was
motivated by a desire to support a particular political candidate
and gain an advantage over a competing newspaper.156  Al-
though appearing to reject these considerations as alone insuffi-
cient to establish actual malice,  the Court affirmed the decision
below because when “read as a whole, it is clear that the conclu-
153 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
154 See  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Garrison , 379 U.S. at 75.
155 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
156 Id . at 664-65.
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sion concerning the newspaper’s departure from accepted stan-
dards and the evidence of motive were merely supportive of the
court’s ultimate conclusion” that the record supported a finding
of actual malice.157  The Court continued by admonishing courts
to “be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors,”
but at the same time acknowledged that a plaintiff is entitled to
prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial
evidence.158
Although the ultimate decision in Connaughton  may well be
correct, and its language not particularly objectionable in the ab-
stract, I am not so sure that lower courts have really taken to
heart its admonition that they be cautious in using such evidence
as indicative of actual malice.  Nor am I particularly surprised.
After all, the Sullivan  standard asks courts and juries to swallow
a bitter pill, and so it should not come as a shock that a gag reflex
often ensues.  But, do we really believe, as the MLRC study dem-
onstrates, that in six of every ten tried libel cases the media inten-
tionally published a calculated falsehood?159  If we do, it is
certainly a sad commentary on the current state of journalism—
too sad, in fact, for me to accept without a good deal more evi-
dence than I have seen in my twenty-five years of working with
the press.  A more likely explanation is that juries and judges are
somewhat understandably, yet unduly, influenced by some com-
bination of a general dislike of the media, disapproval of some of
the hot-dog-like manufacturing processes that they see in con-
nection with the development and production of news reports,
and a sense that the press gets away with too much.  Bruce San-
ford, in his book Don’t Shoot The Messenger , reviews the sources
of much of this general public revulsion and reveals this candid
and chilling observation by one respected former federal judge:
A feeling is abroad among some judges that the Supreme
Court has gone too far in protecting the media from defama-
tion actions resulting from instances of irresponsible journal-
ism . . . .  I’ve been a judge for 15 years, and now that I’ve
taken off my robes, one of the first things I must say is—
Watch Out!  There’s a backlash coming in First Amendment
doctrine.160
157 Id . at 667-68.
158 Id . at 668.
159 See supra  note 42 and accompanying text. R
160 SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 190 (quoting Abner J. Mikva, In My Opinion, R
Those Are Not Facts , 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 291, 296 (1995)).
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Sanford also reported the attitude of one of the jurors who
rendered a verdict of $220 million against the Wall Street Journal :
“They need punishing.”161
It is easy to forget that Connaughton  involved circumstances
that, at least as described by the Court, almost inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the underlying report was seriously doubted
by the newspaper: an obviously suspect source telling an improb-
able story denied by five other witnesses published by a newspa-
per which failed even to try interviewing the one witness most
likely to support the source but whose denial would effectively
kill the story.  But the rather extreme facts underlying Con-
naughton do often seem to be forgotten, or ignored, in favor of a
sort of circumstantial grab-bag that bears little relation to the
kind of mendacious conduct envisioned by Sullivan .  The most
recent example of actual malice run amok is Suzuki Motor Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,162 a Ninth Circuit de-
cision reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment by
finding a triable issue of actual malice.
The case arose out of Consumers Union’s roll-over testing of
various SUVs, including the Suzuki Samurai.  Consumers Union
concluded that the Samurai had a tendency to roll over too easily
and rated the car unsatisfactory.163  It reached this conclusion af-
ter conducting two sets of tests that put various vehicles through
a series of sharp turns.164  The second test was more demanding
than the first and was instituted after the first test when the Sam-
urai’s driver made a steering miscalculation and almost tipped
the car.165  In the second, more demanding test, the Suzuki
tipped up a few times, whereas the other vehicles tested did
not.166  At the risk of oversimplifying, Suzuki’s actual malice
claim revolved around two allegations: that Consumers Union
had a preconceived bias against the Samurai167 and that the more
demanding test was designed to produce the results Consumers
Union wanted.168  The evidence concerning the first point con-
sisted primarily of a few admittedly unfortunate comments made
161 SANFORD, supra  note 51, at 174.
162 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003).
163 Id . at 1125-26, 1129.
164 Id . at 1127-29.
165 Id . at 1116 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
166 Id .
167 See id . at 1115-19.
168 See id . at 1135.
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by people involved in the testing such as: “If you can’t find some-
one to roll this car, I will”; a cheer when the vehicle started to
roll to the effect of “That’s it.  That looked pretty good”; and
“All right Ricky baby” when the Samurai tipped up another
time.169  The second point was bolstered by Consumers Union’s
previous practice of using only the first of the two tests in vehicle
evaluations and certain criticisms of its testing methods by the
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration.170
In short, Suzuki’s challenge boiled down to a circumstantial ar-
gument that mixed evidence of bias with alleged professional
malpractice to create an inference of actual malice, which a ma-
jority of the Ninth Circuit bought, but not without a stinging dis-
sent by Judge Kozinski, who was joined by eleven members of
the court.171  The dissent’s central point was that it is simply im-
possible to believe the plaintiff’s theory because everything that
might have been wrong with Consumers Union’s testing was dis-
closed chapter-and-verse in a 6,500-word article.172  That article
explained in considerable detail, and accurately, how both tests
had been conducted; why a second testing protocol had been ad-
ded; and how all the cars performed in both tests, including that
the Samurai alone tipped up several times.173  Consumers Union
even gave credit to the Samurai as being “actually more maneu-
verable” than the other vehicles in the first, less demanding
test.174  Certainly this cannot be the stuff of which actual malice
is made.  That eleven judges of a federal court of appeals could
look at the same record and reach the opposite conclusion from
an almost equal number of their colleagues alone seems to sug-
gest that something is very wrong here.175
At the heart of Suzuki  was a disagreement over how deferen-
tial a reviewing court should be in evaluating the plaintiff’s evi-
dence at the summary judgment stage.  The majority treated the
case as it would any other summary judgment motion, con-
ducting a de novo review without any special sensitivity to the
169 Id . at 1118, 1135.
170 See id . at 1119-20, 1136-38.
171 See id . at 1111-23.
172 See id . at 1115.
173 See id . at 1115-16.
174 See id . at 1116.
175 Sharper Image Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., No. 03-
4094, 2004 WL 2554451 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing claim against consumer on
grounds that plaintiff could not prove falsity).
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First Amendment values at stake.176  The dissent took quite a dif-
ferent view, arguing for a more stringent review of the case than
is ordinarily called for when First Amendment considerations are
not involved.177  This relatively esoteric issue is of significant
consequence.
As I mentioned earlier, in addition to the prospect of sizeable
verdicts, one of the great deterrents to robust expression in the
wake of Sullivan  is the ever-increasing burden of legal fees in
defending these suits.178  The more protracted the litigation, the
greater the cost and the greater the likelihood that expression
will be deterred out of a desire to avoid the expense.  As the
avoidance of such deterrence was a central rationale for Sullivan ,
it does not seem particularly radical to suggest that the available
procedures be applied in a manner that is especially sensitive to
these concerns.179  The notion that we apply special rules when
expression is involved is not limited to the law of defamation or
to the press.  The overbreadth doctrine, for example, is a creature
of the First Amendment designed to protect speech in ways that
would not be considered in other contexts.180  Injunctions against
speech are considered extraordinary remedies that will rarely be
sustained,181 and perhaps under some circumstances may even be
disregarded if transparently invalid.182  Moreover, the indepen-
dent review doctrine at issue in the Suzuki  case is not limited to
libel law,183 but if used appropriately in that context is one tool
that could at least help to alleviate some of the unnecessary bur-
dens that are associated with the current state of libel
litigation.184
176 See Suzuki , 330 F.3d at 1132-33.
177 Id . at 1113.
178 In his dissent, Judge Kozinski observed that Consumers Union had spent more
than $10 million defending itself in Suzuki  and one other case, whereas its two ad-
versaries had spent more than $25 million. Id . at 1115.
179 See  Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously:  An Analy-
sis of Process in Libel Litigation , 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1784-94 (1998).
180 See  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
181 See, e.g.,  New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
182 See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967); In re  Providence Journal
Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (1st Cir. 1986).
183 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, 515 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1995).
184 Professor Susan Gilles has recognized that the Court has been less than consis-
tent in its development of special procedural rules in libel cases. See  Gilles, supra
note 179, at 1759-65.  Another recent decision involving Consumers Union demon- R
strates how state anti-SLAPP statutes also can effectively reduce the burdens of libel
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III
THE UGLY
An alien reading New York Times Co. v. Sullivan  upon its arri-
val on Earth might reasonably believe that the decision began to
sound the death knell for using the law of libel to punish expres-
sion.  The decision, after all, focused centrally on America’s un-
happy experience with the Sedition Act of 1798, effectively
declaring after 163 years that it violated the First Amendment.
In particular, the Court cited James Madison’s report on the Vir-
ginia Resolutions of 1798 opposing the Sedition Act to the effect
that: “[I]t is manifestly impossible to punish  the intent to bring
those who administer the government into disrepute or con-
tempt, without striking at the right of freely discussing public
characters and measures.”185
Proceeding from its analysis of this failed criminal statute, the
Court drew an analogy to civil litigation, explaining that “[w]hat
a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a crimi-
nal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”186
Finally, noting the size of the Alabama judgment, Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion concluded that “the pall of fear and timidity im-
posed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an
atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot
survive.”187
As this newly arrived alien explored more thoroughly the
United States and its court system, it quickly would have discov-
ered that the grand promise of Sullivan  has remained unfulfilled
in this respect.  Punishing speakers for expression deemed
libelous is a practice that is alive and well in the United States
forty years after Sullivan .
Most commonly this punishment takes the form of punitive
damages that the MLRC found to have been awarded in more
than half of all media libel cases tried since 1980 and that make
up almost two-thirds of the total awards over that period.188  The
average punitive damages award since 1980 exceeded $2 million,
litigation through early termination. See  Sharper Image Corp. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., No. 03-4094, 2004 WL 2554451 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
185 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (emphasis added).
186 Id . at 277.
187 Id . at 278.
188 MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra  note 23, at 35. R
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and that excludes the $200 million award in the MMAR  case.189
Although the frequency and size of punitive awards appears to
have moderated slightly over the last several years, the awards
remain a significant concern.190
The other way of punishing libelous speech is through criminal
prosecution.  In the same year it decided Sullivan , the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a Louisiana criminal libel statute
because it did not require proof of Sullivan  actual malice.191  The
Court did not categorically reject criminal libel,192 however, and
although prosecutions are relatively rare, they have yet to be re-
tired to the same historical dustbin that holds the Sedition Act.
Indeed, in another recent study, the MLRC documented seventy-
seven actual or threatened criminal libel prosecutions since 1965
when the Court struck down Louisiana’s criminal libel statute.193
More troubling still is that most of these prosecutions arose from
criticism of public officials and arguably involved politically moti-
vated and selective prosecution.194  Just last year, the publisher
and editor of a small Kansas alternative newspaper were con-
victed of criminal libel for making the somewhat less than incen-
diary charge that the mayor lived outside the city limits in
violation of a state law.195  The conviction has now been affirmed
on appeal in a decision giving scant attention to the First Amend-
ment implications of the prosecution.196
In this, the fortieth year since the Sullivan  decision, it is worth
asking why this state of affairs persists.  It seems to me that the
time has come to own up to the tension between the First
Amendment and these kinds of punitive responses to expression.
Criminal libel presents the easier case.197  Only seventeen
189 Id . The median for such awards was $300,000. Id.
190 See id . at 2-3.
191 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
192 See id . at 75; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972).
193 MLRC BULLETIN, CRIMINALIZING SPEECH ABOUT REPUTATION:  THE LEG-
ACY OF CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THE U.S. AFTER SULLIVAN & GARRISON, at ii (2003)
[hereinafter MLRC BULLETIN].
194 Id.
195 See  Kansas v. Powers, 95 P.3d 1042 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished).  The
appellate court refused even to consider a media amicus brief on the First Amend-
ment issues raised by the case. See  Media Law Resource Center, MLRC MEDIA
LAW LETTER 27 (Aug. 2004).
196 Id.
197 I refer here to general criminal libel statutes, not narrowly tailored laws falling
into that category of expression which can be regulated pursuant to Chaplinksy v.
New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  Nor do I include more targeted statutes such
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 31  3-MAY-05 13:56
Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan 1233
states still have criminal libel laws,198 and many of those laws
clearly do not comport with the demands of Garrison v. Louisi-
ana ,199 the Supreme Court’s principal pronouncement on the
subject.  Only four states have actually amended their statutes in
accordance with Garrison .200  Although Garrison did not cate-
gorically condemn criminal libel as inconsistent with the First
Amendment, it did reject as outdated the central rationale sup-
porting such statutes, which was the avoidance of breaches of the
peace.201  If the rationale supporting criminal libel no longer is
operative in modern society, it is fair to ask why we are still talk-
ing about these laws at all.  Does the occasional and selective use
of criminal libel for political purposes have any place in an or-
dered society that values free expression as ours does?  The civil
law of libel appears to remain a viable means of redress for many
who are defamed, and as we have seen, it can exact quite a pen-
alty itself, punitive damages aside.  At the very least, we need to
examine whether these kinds of laws continue to serve any useful
purpose.  I suspect they do not.
Punitive damages present a more complex question that de-
serves the kind of serious consideration that is beyond the scope
of these remarks.  Permit me a few observations, however.
Quite apart from Sullivan , the Supreme Court has of late be-
gun to rein in excessive punitive damage awards as inconsistent
with due process.  Most recently, in two decisions, the Court out-
lined three factors to consider when assessing whether a punitive
award satisfies due process: the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct; the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm; and
the relationship between a punitive award and the comparable
criminal or civil penalties that could be awarded for similar mis-
conduct.202  These considerations have special relevance to
claims such as libel that implicate the First Amendment.
as bank libel laws, although I do not mean to suggest that I think these laws satisfy
constitutional demands.
198 MLRC BULLETIN, supra  note 193, at 15. R
199 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
200 MLRC BULLETIN, supra  note 193, at 16. R
201 See 379 U.S. at 69 (“[U]nder modern conditions, when the rule of law is gener-
ally accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, it can hardly be urged
that the maintenance of peace requires a criminal prosecution for private defama-
tion.”) (quoting Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment , 72 YALE L.J. 877, 924 (1963)).
202 See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003);  BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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Evaluating the reprehensibility or outrageousness of a
speaker’s conduct is a perilous undertaking when First Amend-
ment values are at stake.  In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell ,203 the
Supreme Court rejected such a standard in the context of a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, explaining that:
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse
has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression. An “outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of
our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded be-
cause the speech in question may have an adverse emotional
impact on the audience.204
At a time when the press is generally unpopular, the concern is
acute that judges and juries will use punitive damages to express
their disapproval with press institutions or with particularly un-
popular views.
Problems also exist in terms of the ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages generally awarded in libel cases and their rela-
tionship to comparable criminal penalties.  When both
compensatory and punitive damages are awarded, it is usually
the case that the punitive award far outstrips that for compensa-
tion.205  Large punitive awards also bear absolutely no relation to
the comparable penalties available under criminal libel laws,
which generally “provide for fines in relatively miniscule
amounts.”206  This seems clearly at odds with the Court’s admo-
nition that punitive damage awards “should accord ‘substantial
deference’ to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanc-
tions for the conduct at issue.”207
Since Sullivan was decided, many justices of the Supreme
Court have expressed concern about the propriety of punitive
203 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
204 Id. at 55.  Recently, Justice O’Connor observed that punitive damages can be
used to “target unpopular defendants and punish selectively.”  Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 63 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  These considerations
apply with special force to expression. See  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974).
205 See MLRC 2004 REPORT, supra note 23, at 38 tbl.13C. R
206 SACK, supra  note 35, § 10.3.5 at 10-21; see MLRC BULLETIN, supra  note 193, R
at 57-118.
207 Gore , 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)).  It is interesting to note that in making this obser-
vation, the Court drew on its review of the Alabama judgment in Sullivan . See
Gore , 517 U.S. at 583 n.38.
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damages either in libel cases or in the context of the First
Amendment.208  The reasoning in Gertz also brings into question
the propriety of punitive awards in defamation cases:
Juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm
caused.  And they remain free to use their discretion selec-
tively to punish expressions of unpopular views . . . .  [J]ury
discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship.209
Two states, including Oregon, have eliminated punitive dam-
ages in libel cases.210  Perhaps it is time to do the same in the
remaining forty-eight.
CONCLUSION
A measure of how far we have moved from the ideals of Sulli-
van  can be found in the Supreme Court’s most recent encounter
with civil liability of the press for what it publishes: Bartnicki v.
Vopper .211  Whereas in Sullivan speech was a value to be pro-
tected above virtually all others, in Bartnicki  it is a commodity to
be weighed in relative terms with other important interests.212
Bartnicki  involved a civil claim under state and federal wiretap
laws that prohibited the dissemination of the content of illegally
intercepted telephone conversations.213  A radio station, through
no wrongful action on its part, had obtained and broadcast such a
conversation between two union officials involved in a heated la-
bor dispute.214  There was no claim that the station’s broadcast
was false; the only claim was that the dissemination violated the
statutes’ prohibitions against dissemination.215
Bartnicki  was decided by a six-to-three vote.  The majority
opinion, read in isolation, appears reasonably protective of ex-
pression, holding that publication of true speech on a matter of
public concern is not subject to liability absent a contrary need of
the highest order.216  The asserted contrary interest was privacy,
208 See SACK, supra  note 35, §10.3.5.2. R
209 418 U.S. at 350.
210 See  Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975);
Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777 (Or. 1979).
211 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
212 Id .
213 See id . at 517.
214 See id . at 518-19.
215 See id . at 519.
216 Id . at 528.
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which in the particular context of the decision was found insuffi-
cient to override the interest in free expression.217
The weighing of speech interests reflected in Bartnicki is per-
vasive in today’s First Amendment jurisprudence.218  It was for-
eign to Sullivan , and eight years after that decision was still a
concept so unusual that Justice Douglas was able to describe the
notion as “amazing.”219
If somewhere in the 1970s the idea that we should balance
First Amendment rights against other kinds of contrary interests
firmly inserted itself into the equation,220 then the requirement
that infringements on expression pass strict scrutiny at least “con-
fine[d] the balancing process in a manner protective of
speech.”221  But in Bartnicki , a concurring opinion by Justice
Breyer displays what I view as a disturbing willingness to employ
a far more pliable and uncertain kind of weighing.222  According
to these Justices, not only must speech be of public concern to
trump the kinds of privacy interests implicated by Bartnicki , it
must also be of unusual public concern—in this case a perceived
threat of violence—and must be about someone whose interest
in privacy is particularly low—in this case a public figure.223  Be-
cause the vote of these two justices was necessary for the major-
ity—the remaining three members of the Court having
dissented224—it would appear that the concurrence might, in fact,
217 Id.  at 532-35.
218 See, e.g. , Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Commu-
nications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1996).
219 United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
This is not to say that the idea of balancing First Amendment rights against other
interests was a novel concept when Sullivan  was decided.  Justice Felix Frankfurter,
for example, was a passionate advocate for balancing. See  Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The demands of free
speech . . . are better served by candid and informed weighing of competing interests
. . . than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems to be
solved.”).
220 Balancing became entrenched in defamation law in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc ., 418 U.S 323, 343-44 (1974).
221 Denver Area , 518 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
222 See  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535-41 (2001) (Breyer, J., and
O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer explained the basis for his approach in
remarks delivered in 2002 at New York University School of Law. See  Stephen
Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution , 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
223 532 U.S. at 536-40.
224 See id . at 541.
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have some teeth.225
If it does, predicting the outcome of these cases could become
a true adventure in creativity.226  If a public concern standard has
been criticized as too vague,227 what are we to make of a test that
adds to the mix the less-than-precise concept of “unusual” public
concern?  More fundamentally, because Bartnicki  involved facts
that were indisputably true, why are we talking about this any-
way?228  Can the privacy interests involved here really ever
trump free speech where it involves an issue of public con-
cern?229  The answers will have to wait for more decisions by the
225 Compare  McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 463 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that, where an individual justice is needed for the majority,
“the opinion is not  a majority opinion except to the extent that it accords with his
views”), with id . at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he meaning of a majority
opinion is to be found within the opinion itself; the gloss that an individual Justice
chooses to place upon it is not authoritative.”); cf . Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977) (superseded in part by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in
Armstrong v. Bertrand , 336 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2003)) (“When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
226 Justice Kennedy in particular has explained the dangers of such a balancing
approach, which lacks clear legal standards.  These dangers include the subordina-
tion of long-term speech values to the “inequities of the moment,” ad hoc balancing
with its resulting confusion and lack of judicial discipline, and the lack of notice and
fair warning to those who must predict how courts will respond to attempts to sup-
press their speech. Denver Area , 518 U.S. at 785-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  In his Gertz opinion, Justice Powell emphasized the need for
“broad rules of general application” to avoid “unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations.”  418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).  Professor Smolla has also written per-
suasively about the shortcomings of balancing as a means of deciding First Amend-
ment problems. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 39-42
(1992) (explaining that “[o]n the whole, however, the use of the balancing approach
tends to result in relatively low protection for speech, because when balancing is
employed, speech tends to be devalued as just another social interest to be consid-
ered in the mix”).
227 See  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78-87 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
228 Although the Court has refused categorically to rule out the possibility that
some interest might be sufficiently strong to support restricting speech in this con-
text, it has made clear that this would “seldom” be the case. See, e.g.,  Smith v. Daily
Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
229 In cases decided during the Sullivan era, the only kinds of interests considered
as potentially strong enough to justify restrictions on speech were themselves consti-
tutionally based. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (right to a
fair trial); see also  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (na-
tional security). The Court has not recognized a general right of privacy in the Con-
stitution, nor has it found a more specific right of telephone privacy outside the
context of the Fourth Amendment. See  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51
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Court, or at least a more considered examination than I have
opportunity to conduct in this forum.  These questions do, how-
ever, lead me back to where I began: Do we feel lucky?  It is
unfortunate that forty years after Sullivan , we still need to ask
this, but that we do suggests the answer is in some doubt.
(1967).  Beyond specific constitutional guarantees—for example, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by the gov-
ernment or the First Amendment’s protection of associational privacy—the Court’s
recognition of broader constitutionally-based privacy interests has generally been
limited to intimate and personal decisions in areas such as procreation, sexual con-
duct, marriage, and education. See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74
(2003); Katz , 389 U.S. at 350-51.
